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FELONY PLEA BARGAINING IN SIX COLORADO
JUDICIAL DISTRICTS: A LIMITED INQUIRY INTO
THE NATURE OF THE PROCESS
THOMAS A. GOLDSMITH*
"No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first-verdict
afterwards."'
"Breaking rocks in the hot, hot sun. I fought the law and the
law won."
2
"Brought up to believe that the soul of the American justice
system is based on the determination of truth, and the protec-




Most felony cases are resolved by a plea of guilty: Not necessarily a
plea to the crime actually charged, but rather an induced negotiated plea
to a charge that may, in some instances, be less serious than the crime
that was actually committed. 4 Although plea bargaining 5 has been con-
sistently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court, 6 much of the
relevant literature implies that this practice is a pathological deviation
DistrictJudge, SeventhJudicial District, Gunnison, Colorado. B.A.,J.D., University of
Florida; Master of Judicial Studies 1989 (forthcoming) University of Nevada-Reno.
This article is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master ofJudicial Stud-
ies degree program at the University of Nevada-Reno, in cooperation with the National
Judicial College.
The author thanks the clerks and court administrators who helped him gather infor-
mation from their files, the judges and lawyers who patiently answered his many questions,
and the individuals whose criticism and assistance helped make this a better article, includ-
ing: Professors Malcolm Feeley, James Richardson, James Berry and Pat Sterling; Judges
Charles McGee (Nevada), Jerry Lincoln, John Kuenhold, Charles Buss and Joseph Bel-
lipanni; and, research associate Marlene Thornton of the National Center for State Courts.
1. L. CARROLL, ALICES's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 122 (1966).
2. Sonny Curtis (1966).
3. Note, Plea Bargaining: The New Hampshire "Ban ", 9 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CON-
FINEMENT 387, 396 (1983).
4. Davis, Griffiths and Napoleon, Bargain-Basement Justice: Judicial Responsibility for the
Plea Bargaining System, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 319, 321 (1979).
5. In this article, the term "plea bargaining" will be used to mean any process by
which inducements are offered in exchange for any concession of criminal liability. This
broad definition which was borrowed from Weninger's, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A
Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987), has been used because
techniques such as deferred judgments and dismissals with restitution, which do not al-
ways produce formal determinations of guilt, were frequently observed.
6. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
21, 29 (1974); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973); Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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from a proper course of events in the criminal justice system.7
Critics of plea bargaining often charge that its rise in popularity
represents the triumph of administrative and organizational interests
over justice. Collectively opponents believe that it commercializes a
normative process, perverts the attorney-client relationship, diminishes
the role of judges, and undercuts important legal doctrines. Further-
more, opponents feel that it promotes laziness, incompetence, and
favoritism by personal influence. Finally, adversaries allege that it en-
courages unwarranted leniency toward the guilty and conviction of the
innocent, and merges the tasks of adjudication and sentencing, thus al-
lowing the public to think that the guilty are getting away with
something.8
Plea bargaining does, however, have its supporters. 9 In a study of
six Colorado judicial districts, 10 fifty per-cent of the judges and a major-
ity of the lawyers interviewed believed that plea bargaining serves a use-
ful purpose when responsible people are involved." Some of those
interviewed commented that it can individualize justice and produce
more consistent results. Others commented that in the presence of
overcharging, a plea bargain can produce conviction for crimes actually
committed, and thereby produce appropriate sentences. Yet even those
judges and lawyers who supported it, expressed concern. As one judge
put it, "in the hands of the skilled it's a surgeon's scalpel. But in the
hands of the unskilled it's a butcher knife."
The purpose of this article is to present both surveyed and empiri-
cal information of felony plea bargaining practice in Colorado. This ar-
ticle will present the findings of a survey conducted of six Colorado
judicial districts. 12 The opinions of both judges and lawyers from each
of these districts address the growing concern over the Colorado plea
bargaining process. It is the author's hope that this article will en-
courage further investigation of the Colorado plea bargaining process,
and the development of guidelines for a uniform plea bargaining
system.
II. CONTRASTED VIEWS OF THE COLORADO LEGAL PROFESSION
Most of the judges interviewed felt that plea bargaining was forced
upon them. Yet, many felt that less bargaining was possible and that
they could agree to changes in current trial procedures if such changes
would reduce the overall occurrence of plea bargaining. Furthermore,
many felt that certain aspects of plea bargaining such as sentencing con-
7. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 199, 201 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to
the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 934 (1983). Many of the judges inter-
viewed in this study agreed. See infra Appendices A and B.
9. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 934.
10. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
11. The 27 judges whose cases were examined in this study were interviewed, as were
the six district attorneys, and the six lead public defenders in the districts studied.
12. See infra Appendices A and B.
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cessions should be eliminated. Finally, some expressed concern that
plea bargaining had taken them "out of the game," and many of those
who felt that they were still in the game were unclear about the proper
extent of their participation in the regulation of plea bargaining.
Generally, the lawyers interviewed like plea bargaining. Many be-
lieve that it works because it aids in producing justice in an overworked
system. Furthermore, lawyers were not particularly concerned that
rights may be lost in the process because the rights at risk are not that
valuable in practice. The lawyers interviewed think plea bargaining re-
flects the desire of many Americans for a deal, and that it will continue
to be utilized because of economic necessity, human nature, local poli-
tics, and a perceived need for intangible justice. Nevertheless, the law-
yers also expressed concern that the process may distort the traditional
lawyer-client relationship.
A number of the judges and lawyers interviewed did not agree that
plea bargaining responds to existing problems. These judges and law-
yers believe that it can produce or maintain some of the abuses it is
designed to correct. One question they raised was: Do prosecutors
overcharge because of plea bargaining or does plea bargaining exist, in
part, because of overcharging?
Some legal scholars feel that bargaining for justice is inappropriate
and view it with distaste. 13 A leading critic of plea bargaining, former
University of Colorado Law Professor Albert Alschuler, suggests that
plea bargaining may be distasteful to the public because it implies that
defendants are only half-guilty, which is a concept that most people with
a moralistic view of punishment find difficult to accept. To Alschuler, if
the criminal process works at all, it may be because it reinforces con-
cepts of moral responsibility and moral guilt that cannot be properly
compromised. 14 Nevertheless, the inevitability of plea bargaining is
now generally accepted,15 and many Colorado judges, district attorneys,
and lead public defenders that were interviewed agreed with this conclu-
sion. 16 The current trend, therefore, is for control, not abolition.'
7
Clearly, plea bargaining would not exist if advantage could not be
derived from it. One of the rationales given for its widespread use is
that it allows justice to be done. In a recent article discussing its use, it
was said that, "[m]andatory sentencing laws [have] induce[d] wholesale
circumvention and manipulation by judges, prosecutors and defense
13. M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 156, n.l I (1978);J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS 130 (1982).
14. See Alschuler, supra note 8.
15. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. Svs. J 338
(1982); butsee Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984) (argu-
ing that it is not inevitable).
16. See infra Appendices A and B.
17. Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L. BuLL. 101
(1978). In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals proposed complete abolition of plea bargaining by 1978.
19891 245
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counsel determined to prevent injustice in individual cases .... ,18
III. QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
What are the advantages to negotiating a plea as opposed to going
to trial? What drives plea bargaining? These questions have been asked
and answered often without producing any meaningful change. 19
Therefore, it might be more useful to begin addressing questions such
as: Does the operation of the system by which felony cases are resolved
conform to the justice system's formal specifications? Does plea bar-
gaining, as practiced, comply with basic notions of how a just judicial
system ought to work? Are there differences between doctrine and
practice?
20
Similar to other state legislatures, the Colorado General Assembly
maintains an expensive and elaborate jury-trial system through which
felony cases may be regularly resolved. However, that jury-trial system
is rarely used. 2 1 Instead, most felony cases are resolved through plea
bargaining, a system that the General Assembly also maintains.
22
Therefore, since plea bargaining is the real felony resolution system, it
should be studied thoroughly to make it as effective as possible.
The Colorado General Assembly has mandated long prison
sentences in many cases, yet it also compels mitigation of sentences by
withholding the funds necessary to carry them out. 2 3 Perhaps then, as
has been suggested, it may be necessary to subvert the system to make
room in prisons for new offenders. 24 Similarly, if Colorado is unwilling
to provide the funds necessary to make jury trials effectively available to
all defendants, then plea bargaining and its discretion may be the only
way to resolve the many pending felony cases.
18. Morris & Tonry, Presiding in Criminal Court: An Introduction, 72 JUDICATURE 7, 10
(1988).
19. SeeJ. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS (1982).
20. The notion that a legal system may operate in a manner significantly different
from its formally stated specifications can be traced back to a single, seminal article written
by the influential Roscoe Pound in 1910. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.
U.L. REV. 12 (1910). Two years later he expanded on this notion saying that "the life of
the law is in its enforcement," and he advocated the study of the workings of the law so
that it could be made most effective. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 514 (1912). Pound's call for empirical research not only influ-
enced his own generation, but also future generations including our own. See, e.g., the
June/July 1988 symposium issue of JUDICATURE, vol. 72, on policy-relevant research.
21. See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301 (1986).
23. It has been suggested that the public demands long prison sentences because it
does not support probation:
In an era . . . in which many public officials believe that the public demands
greater certainty and severity in the imposition of punishments, .... new interme-
diate sanctions must be more intrusive and punitive than nominal probation if
they are to be credible. In other words, pressures now exist that call for develop-
ment of new non-incarcerative sanctions that are less punitive than imprisonment
and more punitive than probation.
See Morris & Tonry, supra note 18, at 9.




What guides the exercise of the discretion inherent in plea bargain-
ing? Is it exercised in a consistent, equal and uniform manner? Is it
subject to meaningful regulation? Does it conform to basic notions of
how ajust judicial system ought to operate? These questions are impor-
tant because "[t]he fairness and consistency of the process by which fel-
ony disputes are handled [in the trial courts] goes to the heart of our
conceptions of justice."
25
This article, in presenting findings from a study of six Colorado ju-
dicial districts, addresses these important questions. This article began
as a general study of felony resolution practices, but quickly became a
specific study of plea bargaining practices after it became evident that
almost all of the cases examined had been resolved through negotiation
without trial, and that most of the defendants had plead guilty "or other-
wise admitted their guilt.
By admitting their guilt, these defendants had given up arguably
valuable constitutional rights such as the right to confront one's ac-
cuser(s) in a trial by jury,26 the right to remain silent at trial, 2 7 the right
to a presumption of innocence and the right to an acquittal after trial
unless all reasonable doubt about guilt had been eliminated.
2 8
While plea bargaining affects the exercise of these defendants'
rights, it also impacts public rights including the right to have the pun-
ishment fit the crime, and the right to observe the administration ofjus-
tice. Since the sentence was often determined before guilt had finally
been resolved, important constitutional questions of due process and
equal protection could have been involved if harsher sentences were im-
posed on those who went to trial than on those who plea bargained.
2 9
If the practice observed in the six judicial districts included in this
study reflects practice throughout Colorado,3 0 then plea bargaining is
25. Nardulli, Flemming & Eisenstein, Criminal Courts and Bureaucraticjustice: Concessions
and Consensus in the Guilty Plea Process, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1103, 1104 (1985). It
has been argued, though, that this concern for the loss of constitutional rights misses a
reality: that it was the development of those valuable rights that gave defendants the bar-
gaining power that in turn gave rise to plea bargaining. See Langbein, Understanding the
Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 261 (1979).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speech and public trial .... and ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... ").
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself....").
28. Parnas, Proposed Legislation Facilitating Discussions of Statutory Regulations of Plea Bar-
gaining, 13 AM.J. CRIM. L. 381, 331 (1986).
29. However, most of the judges interviewed said that they did not impose harsher
sentences on defendants who exercised their right to trial. See Bond, supra note 19.
30. The conclusions reached in this study may hold true throughout Colorado.
Rarely... does a [researcher] question all of the people in whose views or behav-
ior he or she is interested. Instead the researcher takes a subset or sample of the
larger population about which he or she wishes to make inferences. The critical
aspect of a sample is that it be representative of the population from which it is
drawn.
D. MONAHAN & P. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 58 (1985). This study involved an effort
to do empirical research on a subject that was difficult to control, under circumstances
hard to control. All data was collected by the author who had limited time and money
1989]
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the standard means for the resolution of felony cases in Colorado.
IV. METHODOLOGY OF STUDY
The six districts studied were chosen for their diverseness and are
thought to be representative of current Colorado practice. The study
included districts from the eastern and western slope of the continental
divide, districts with different population densities,3 1 and districts with
discernible cultural elements such as city dwellers, farmers and ranch-
ers, ski area dwellers, and persons from diverse ethnic backgrounds.
The six districts studied were the third, seventh, eleventh, twelfth, twen-
tieth, and the twenty-first. 3 2 In each district, cases were examined in
both the ,district and county courts. The districts are highlighted on the
accompanying page in Diagram I.
A practical examination of hundreds of felony cases to determine
how they were resolved was considered appropriate because such hard
data can provide the most reliable basis for formulating proper re-
sponses to any perceived problems in the trial courts.33 All data was
collected during the first six months of 1988. Since this study was con-
available. Simple random sampling of cases could not be used because of the need to mix
rural and urban districts in the study. If only urban districts had been necessary then
important interdependent variables could have been more easily controlled such as the
number of case files to be examined, the time frame within which the activity was to be
observed, the types of crimes involved, and the identities of the parties involved. Because
rural districts had to be included an effort was made to balance these variables and strati-
fied random sampling was therefore used to promote the representativeness of the dis-
tricts and the cases examined. On the use of stratified random sampling, see generally W.
GOODE, METHODS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH 221-25 (1952).
Since simple random subject selection could not be used it would be appropriate for
others to replicate this study before the results offered here are afforded statewide applica-
tion. For the importance of replication see H. BLALOCK & A. BLALOCK, METHODOLOGY IN
SOCIAL RESEARCH 13-18 (1968). However, replication as confirmation requires carefully
controlling significant variables which are not always possible outside a laboratory where
human choice is involved, as is the case here.
In the final analysis, studies such as the one presented here may have to be limited to
describing what has happened and not to infer what will happen, K. HAMMOND, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STATISTICAL METHOD 9 (1963); and to identify those principles and relation-
ships that survive across heterogeneous circumstances, see also W. CRANO, PRINCIPLES OF
RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1973).
31. According to 1980 census figures, about 190,000 persons live in the twentieth
Judicial District, about 81,500 in the twenty-first, about 62,000 in the seventh, about
49,000 in the eleventh, about 38,000 in the twelfth, and about 21,500 in the third. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE (1980).
32. The twentieth and the twenty-first districts are relatively well populated single-
county districts. Boulder is the principal city in the twentieth and Grand Junction is the
principal city in the twenty-first. The other four districts are rural, less populated, multi-
county districts. There are two counties in the third district: Las Animas and Huerfano;
four counties in the eleventh district: Chaffee, Fremont, Park and Sumter; and, six coun-
ties in the seventh and twelfth districts. The seventh district consists of Delta, Gunnison,
Hinsdale, Montrose, Ouray and San Miguel counties. The twelfth district includes the
counties of Alamosa, Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande and Saguache. Politically
significant communities in these districts include Alamosa, Boulder, Canon City, Creede,
Crested Butte, Delta, Grand Junction, Gunnison, Monte Vista, Montrose, Ouray, Salida,
Telluride, Trinidad and Walsenburg.
33. On the importance of "hard data" to the proper study of trial courts, see Nardulli,
Flemming & Eisenstein, Criminal Courts and Bureaucratic Justice: Concessions and Consensus in
the Guilty Plea Process, supra note 22, at 1113 (1985). A hands-on examination was also
[Vol. 66:2
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cerned with resolution practices, only closed files were included. Also,
since the study was concerned with observing a significant number of
cases, the time frame of activity that was observed varied. In the urban
districts, this meant only going back a few months; but, in the rural dis-
tricts, it often meant going back a year. Over one-hundred files were
examined in each district. 34 While it was easy to find recently closed
files in the more populous districts such as the twentieth, this was not
possible in the rural districts such as the third.
3 5
Only files that had been closed on their merits were included in the
study. Files that did not present a chance for plea bargaining were ex-
cluded, such as extradition cases or cases in which the defendant failed
to appear.
The author traveled to each of the courts involved in the study, and
in all instances personally examined each file to limit data gathering er-
rors. Similarly, each judge and lawyer was personally interviewed by the
author.
The process used to gather information from the files was straight
forward. Examination began with the most recently closed cases and
proceeded backward in time. In relatively busy communities such as
Boulder3 6 or Grand Junction 3 7 this required going back only a few
months, but in other districts it meant going back many months. There-
fore, it was sometimes necessary to examine all of the 1987 cases to ob-
tain an appreciable sample.3 8 As expected, the duration for closing
cases varied. 39 The district court cases that were examined were closed
during a span of twenty-four months, with most closed between July
1987 and March 1988. Closing activity was seen in all district courts
during a five month span between October 1987 and February 1988.
The county court cases that were examined were closed during a span of
sixteen months, with most closed between June 1987 and March 1988.
Closing activity was seen in all county courts during a three month span
between October 1987 and January 1988. Since all of the districts stud-
ied have more than one judge, cases were distributed among judges that
were serving on the bench at the time the examined cases were resolved.
necessary because the Colorado court system does not have and therefore cannot provide
the kind of information that is necessary to conduct a study of this type.
34. The exact number of cases was not reviewed in each district for a variety of rea-
sons including: field limitations such as constraints on the author's time and the time of
court personnel; geographic limitations (rural courts in multi-county districts were typi-
cally not "busy"); time frame restrictions on practice to be observed (going back into 1986
would skew results);judge-mix needs (apportionment of cases amongjudges involved dur-
ing the timeframe observed); and refinement needs (some cases had to be passed over
because they had not provided a chance for plea bargaining or had not yet been closed or
were missing from the files).
35. The Colorado court system reported by telephone on July 20, 1988, that felony
district court closings in 1987 were: Ninety closings in the third district; 189 closings in
the seventh district; 294 closings in the eleventh district; 100 closings in the twelfth dis-
trict; 793 closings in the twentieth district; and 363 closings in the twenty-first district.
36. The twentieth Judicial District.
37. The twenty-first Judicial District.
38. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Appendices A and B.
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In addition to the file number, other data was also collected such as:
the original police charges, formal charges that were filed by the prose-
cution, any changes to those charges, and the method of resolution such
as dismissal, trial or plea. Furthermore, when available, an explanation
of the particular type of resolution chosen was included. This often in-
cludes the prosecutor's decision not to file felony charges, to dismiss
them or to reduce them to misdemeanors after filing. In addition, when
available, sentencing concessions, such as guarantees of probation or
agreements that limited the number of years that the defendant was to
serve were also noted.
Some judicial districts do not use written dispositional stipulations
or plea agreements. Thus, written explanations for a particular action
were often not found in the court file. In addition, not all judges follow
the American Bar Association's recommendation that court files should
speak for themselves. 40 Currently, Colorado has no uniform system of
plea bargain record-keeping.
V. BEHIND THE SCENES IN THE COLORADO COURT SYSTEM
A. Plea Bargaining in County Court
Two types of state trial courts exist in Colorado: county courts and
district courts. 4 1 A felony case usually starts off in a county court where
a county judge determines whether there is sufficient evidence to allow
the case to proceed. If there is sufficient evidence the case is then for-
warded to the district court for trial or other resolution. Often, how-
ever, rather than being forwarded, felony cases are resolved in the
county court through the activity that is commonly known as plea bar-
gaining. 4 2 In fact, a significant number of the felony cases examined ap-
pear to be resolved by plea bargaining.
Straightforward bargaining of felony cases in county courts involves
the defendant's agreement to plead guilty to one or more misdemeanors
in return for dismissal of all felony charges. However, other conduct,
suggestive of plea bargaining, was also seen, such as complete dismissal
of all charges with the defendant agreeing to pay restitution to the vic-
tim even though he had not admitted that he had committed a crime or
been found guilty of committing any crime.
As Table I indicates, the frequency of straight forward plea bargain-
ing in the county courts ranged from zero percent to twenty-six percent
with most county courts showing more than fifteen percent. However, a
focus on straightforward bargaining activity alone does not accurately
reflect the full extent of the bargaining-type activity that may take place
40. A.B.A., Guilty Plea Standards, NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS PROCEEDING 69 (1973).
41. Municipal courts in Colorado are not "state" courts.
42. Only one county judge reported an absence of felony bargaining activity, saying
that the district attorney did not want bargaining of felony cases to go on there. Another
county judge reported little felony bargaining because most felony cases were filed directly
into district court by order of his chiefjudge.
1989]
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in the county courts. In addition to straightforward bargaining, many
prosecutors also regularly dismissed cases and made other decisions
suggestive of plea bargaining. The frequency of such activity is also de-
scribed in Table I in the column labelled "Prosecution Dismissal."
Very few of the cases examined were dismissed for lack of evi-
dence. 43 When those cases along with the cases that had been for-
warded to the district courts for resolution were removed from
consideration, the percentage of felony cases left to be resolved in the
county courts ranged from twelve percent to fifty-two percent. 44 While
it cannot be said authoritatively that all of these cases were resolved
through bargaining-type activity because county court paper tracks are
not clear enough to say that it appears that prosecutors often decided to
dismiss them or lessen them following plea bargaining. As Table I indi-
cates, many felony cases were dismissed completely in the county courts
after formal charges had been filed which suggested that an agreement
akin to a deferred judgment had been reached, a common felony resolu-
tion practice used in the district courts. In some instances the files con-
tained statements to that effect, for example, that the defendant agreed
to pay restitution to his or her victim even though the charges were be-
ing dismissed. Therefore, based on the information collected in this
study, it appears that felony cases are often resolved in county courts
through bargaining-type activity.
43. In four of the six districts in this study there were no cases that had been dis-
missed for lack of evidence. In one district, one case had been dismissed for lack of evi-
dence and in another district two cases had been dismissed for that reason.
44. These percentages were derived by adding the sums of the columns in Table I
labelled: "Straightforward Bargain" (the number of instances in which the prosecution
had reduced felony charges to misdemeanors to which the defendant plead guilty); "Mis-
demeanor Charging" (the number of instances in which the prosecution charged a misde-
meanor even though the defendant had been arrested for a felony); and "Prosecution
Dismissal" (the number of instances in which the prosecution dismissed all charges after
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B. Plea Bargaining in District Court
Table II describes how often customary felony resolution tech-
niques used in district court were observed. These techniques include
voluntary dismissal by the prosecution, non-induced pleas of guilty from
defendants, straight forward bargaining, and trial. As Table II shows,
felony cases were often resolved through straightforward bargaining,
ranging from sixty-five percent in some districts to eighty-eight percent
in others. When the cases that were obviously bargained are added to
those that were voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution, as many as
ninety-five percent of the district court cases may have been resolved
through negotiated admissions of responsibility, which confirms na-
tional estimates.
52
The files of cases that were voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution
often reflected that some bargaining had occurred. In many instances,
defendants agreed to pay restitution to the victims even though the case
had been dismissed. Thus, it is appropriate to consider cases that were
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution along with the cases that were
obviously bargained.
In the Grand Junction district, 53 eighty-eight percent of the cases
were clearly resolved through bargaining and perhaps as many as
ninety-nine percent when the cases voluntarily dismissed by the prose-
cution are added. In the Boulder district,54 at least eighty-three percent
of the cases were resolved through bargaining and perhaps all of the
cases examined when those voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution are
added. In the Alamosa district, 55 at least eighty-one percent and per-
haps ninety-five percent of the cases examined were resolved through
plea bargaining. In the Canon City/Salida district,5 6 at least sixty-five
percent of the cases were resolved through bargaining and possibly
eighty-nine percent when those voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution
are added. In the Montrose/Gunnison/Telluride district,5 7 at least
eighty-two percent of the cases examined were resolved through plea
bargaining and perhaps ninety percent after those dismissed by the
prosecution are added. Finally, in the Trinidad/Walsenburg district,
5 8
at least seventy-five percent of the cases examined were resolved
through bargaining and possibly ninety-four percent when the cases vol-
untarily dismissed by the prosecution are added.
52. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE,
Task Force Report: The Courts 9 (1967).
53. The Twenty-first Judicial District.
54. The Twentieth Judicial District.
55. The Twelfth Judicial District.
56. The Eleventh Judicial District.
57. The Seventh Judicial District.
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VI. DiSCUSSION
Colorado plea bargaining practices are not uniform; they differ
from district to district, prosecutor to prosecutor, and judge to judge.
The techniques used and the results obtained depend on numerous vari-
ables such as the parties involved in the process, the location, as well as
the types of offenses being negotiated. Therefore, while it is true that
the vast majority of felony cases are resolved through negotiated admis-
sions of responsibility, it is important to note that the process, while
being pervasive, is also site specific. For example, some prosecutors re-
ported limits on plea bargaining while others reported different limits,
and some judges were willing to allow limits on their sentencing discre-
tion while others were not.
63
The effort undertaken by this study was to begin an empirical exam-
ination of the felony resolution practices in Colorado. In many in-
stances, the practice in a particular court pursuant to the local legal
culture may be predictable and local practice may produce justice in in-
dividual cases. Additional research is needed to distinguish between
bargaining techniques that reach the same end in all cases and tech-
niques that may lead to different results in the same type of cases. Addi-
tional research is needed to examine how the various plea bargaining
techniques are effected by factors such as the charges originally filed, the
defendant's prior record, and mitigating circumstances.
Some of the plea bargaining seemed tailored to a specific case while
other bargaining appeared routine and bureaucratic, bureaucratic in the
sense that it seemed to reflect administrative pressures to move cases
along rather than careful consideration of individual cases. Examples of
such bargaining include: regularly granting deferred judgments without
conviction of any offense to first-time felony offenders; regularly afford-
ing defendants dismissal-on-restitution if they were accused of crimes
just inside the felony range such as theft of property valued at $350; and
regularly granting sentencing concessions to serious offenders.
Plea bargaining's many forms suggest that care can be taken with
individual defendants and victims to fashion appropriate results. Never-
theless, its many forms also suggest a potential for justice to be adminis-
tered quite differently in arguably similar cases. Successful plea
bargaining usually involves the interplay of many resolution techniques
including deferred judgment,6 abandonment of charges, reduction of
charges, dismissal of charges, and sentencing concessions. As Table III
indicates, the instances in which these plea bargaining techniques were
used in each district varied. For example, the instances in which district
court felony cases were resolved by reducing charges ranged from four-
teen percent in the twentieth district to forty percent in the twelfth dis-
trict, and the instances in which district court felony cases were resolved
63. See infra Appendices A and B.
64. A deferred judgment involves a plea of guilty to the charge but not a conviction.
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through deferred judgments ranged from fifteen percent in the third
district to thirty-five percent in the twentieth district.
This varied use of plea bargaining techniques suggest a lack of or-
der and a lack of statewide policy. If plea bargaining practices were in
fact driven by statewide policy, then the differences between the ob-
served frequencies of use of specific plea bargaining techniques and the
expected frequencies of use should be small. In other words, one would
expect the frequencies of use of these techniques to be generally the
same across district lines. However, the opposite was observed. Indeed,
the frequencies of use of these techniques varied considerably from dis-
trict to district. Social scientists often use the statistic chi square to ana-
lyze this type of data. 66 We may hypothesize that a particular plea
bargaining technique will be seen a certain number of times, and then
state how many of a sample of cases should show use of that technique.
If the hypothesis is acceptable, the difference between observed and ex-
pected should be no larger than on the basis of chance. If the observed
difference is too large, not apt to arise from chance, the stated hypothe-
sis becomes suspect. Using the chi square analysis, the potential that
chance would produce the variety of use observed here is one in a thou-
sand.6 7 Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that each district employs
a unique policy, and that there is no cohesive statewide policy.
68
The varied use of techniques also suggests that the prosecutors and
judges involved did not have shared attitudes about the use of these
resolution techniques, which they often confirmed in their interviews. 6 9
Furthermore, the variety of use suggests that the locale of the prosecu-




In the six districts studied, plea bargaining appears to be site spe-
cific, which reflects, among other things, lack of agreement on its accept-
able features and on its proper limits. The absence of recognized,
statewide standards for judicial review of proposed plea bargains results
in a lack of uniform practice. 7 1 The absence of such standards explains
66. The "chi square" analysis is the sum of the squared differences between the ob-
served and expected frequencies, each divided by the expected frequencies.
67. See infra Appendix C.
68. For general discussion on the use of chi square, see G. MCNEMARA, PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATISTICs (3d ed. 1966).
69. See infra Appendix A.
70. Should the particular prosecutor, defense attorney or judge involved in a case
make a difference for bargaining purposes?
71. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.430-.460 (1988 & Supp. 1989) (recom-
mended prosecuting standards for charging and plea dispositions). Regarding any plea
disposition, the general standard in Washington State is that "a defendant ... [ius ex-
pected to plead guilty to the charge or charges which adequately describe the nature of his
or her criminal conduct or go to trial." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.450 (1988). The
statute goes on to describe a limited number of exceptions to this general rule and the
circumstances which give rise to their application. Also included in the statutory scheme
are specific guidelines regarding the decision to prosecute.
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why plea bargaining is personal, geographic and clubby, and why it does
not now appear to be subject to the rule of law.
7 2
The rule of law calls for decisions to be made through the applica-
tion of known principles with minimum intervention of discretion in
their application. While the american west has been described as having
traditionally minimized the role of the rule of law and granted prosecu-
tors legally questionable discretion, 7 3 too much discretion is recognized
as being dangerous to contemporary legal systems. The contemporary
philosopher John Rawls has warned that:
[i]f deviations from justice as regularity are too pervasive, a se-
rious question may arise whether a system of law exists as op-
posed to a collection of particular orders designed to advance
the interests of a dictator or the ideal of a benevolent des-
pot.... The Rule of Law ... implies the precept that similar
cases be treated similarly.
74
A. The Need for Legislative Action
Clearly, uniform equal criminal justice, is not being achieved
through uniform procedure. 7 5 If such uniformity is to occur it will likely
require legislative action. The form that such legislative action takes will
obviously be of great consequence to every individual who becomes in-
volved in plea bargaining.
Legislative action would likely reflect a desire to restrict, or at least
inhibit, current plea bargaining activities. For example, the Colorado
General Assembly could try to inhibit the current avoidance of its defacto
sentencing guidelines. Under current legislative policy, mandatory im-
prisonment and stiff prison sentences are required in many instances.
Yet these requirements are not followed when the prosecution agrees
not to file sentencing enhancement charges, or agrees to abandon such
charges after they are filed, or permit deferred judgments, or agrees to
grant sentencing concessions.
The General Assembly could also require that defendants accept
full responsibility for the crime(s) they actually commit. For example,
the General Assembly might try to inhibit the widespread use of de-
ferred judgment, a seductively disarming felony resolution technique.
When judgment is deferred in felony cases, the accused pleads guilty to
a serious crime, the prosecution "wins" another case, and the court is
able to move on to other pressing cases. However, built into this pro-
cess is an assumption on the part of accused felons that they will success-
72. For a definition of the "rule of law" see Black's Law Dictionary 712 (5th ed. 1979).
73. See supra note 24.
74. J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 237-38 (1971). For a general discussion of differing
notions about the rule of law in contemporary society, see R. WOLFF, THE RULE OF LAW
(1971).
75. Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring). Justice Douglas stated that "[s]teadfast adherence to strict procedural
safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law." Id. at 179. See
also O'Conner, Pretrial Publicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of Procedural
Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 170 (1988).
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fully complete probationary-like terms that usually last two or more
years. If they do, then the prosecution will dismiss the on-hold felony
charges and the felony conviction will be avoided.
Many accused felons are willing to make the assumption that they
will successfully complete such probationary-like terms. Unfortunately,
it is an assumption that does not always prove to be true. Deferred judg-
ments are revoked and defendants then find themselves convicted of
felonies without the benefit of trial. Such defendants sometimes claim
they were pressured into admitting their guilt and claim that they have
been victimized by an oppressive system. When this happens, guilty
pleas and determinations of guilt lose their moral force and defendants
do not assume responsibility for the crime(s) they actually commit.
This does not mean that deferred judgment is inappropriate in
every case and that the General Assembly should prohibit it altogether.
Rather, these circumstances might impel the General Assembly to re-
quire more direct involvement of trial judges in the plea bargaining pro-
cess, and to require a fuller record in each case than is now required.
B. Guidelines to be Followed
Any statutory guidelines and requirements concerning plea bar-
gaining should balance the rights of the accused, the safety of the public,
and the economic reality of scarce judicial resources. Statutory guide-
lines and requirements should therefore describe:
1. The factors that the prosecution must consider in deter-
mining whether to decline to prosecute some or all of the pos-
sible charges that might lead to conviction, and whether to
agree to sentencing concessions.
2. The circumstances that the prosecution must show exist to
support the proposed plea bargain in each case.
3. The factors that the prosecution must show exist to warrant
avoidance of sentencing enhancement policies established by
the General Assembly.
4. The rights that similarly situated defendants have to equal
opportunities to resolve their criminal charges without trial.
5. The findings that trial judges must ordinarily make to war-
rant approval of the plea bargains proposed in each case.
6. The circumstances in which a guilty plea should not be ac-
cepted, including the circumstances, without limitation, in
which it should be found that the public interest would not be
served by a proposed plea bargain.
7. The trial judge's duty, if any, to ensure that evidence exists
to support a finding of guilt where the defendant pleads guilty
while asserting innocence.
8. The circumstances when it is appropriate to record the
terms of a plea bargain in chambers and not in open court.
76
76. For an example of a statute that might work in Colorado, see Parnas, Proposed




Additional factors relating specifically to current Colorado practice
that ought to be considered in the formulation of appropriate guidelines
include:
1. County judges are often involved in the plea bargained res-
olution of felony cases. Therefore, they are required by Colo-
rado criminal procedure to exercise the same "independent
judgment" over proposed plea bargains that district judges are
accustomed to exercising.7 7 Since all of Colorado's county
judges do not have to be full-time judges and do not always
have to be lawyers, clear standards enumerating a judge's du-
ties for plea bargains would probably greatly assist them.
2. Prosecutors and judges do not all agree on the appropriate
parameters of plea bargaining. Therefore, specific guidelines
should be set for statewide policies on issues such as:
(A) May all charges be dismissed because the de-
fendant has agreed to make or has made restitution?
(B) When is it appropriate that deferred judgment
be granted without conviction of any offense? Is it gener-
ally appropriate in any of the following instances: When it
is the defendant's first serious offense, or when the defend-
ant is young, or when the defendant has made or agreed to
make restitution?
(C) May sentence concessions routinely be a part of
plea bargains? If so, what are the proper parameters of
such concessions? Are restrictions on sentencing and
guarantees of probation appropriate? And if so, when?
(D) What rights do victims have to participate in or
be made aware of plea discussions? 78 Should the court be
made aware of the victim's concerns?
79
(E) Should plea bargains customarily be reduced to
writing and become part of the court file in each case?
(F) Should all district attorneys publish broad policy
guidelines on plea bargaining?
80
C. Propriety of Judicial Supervision of Plea Bargaining
Although procedural rules now exist in Colorado to regulate the
77. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(0(5).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-601 (1986) (recognizing a victim's right to be heard at
sentencing).
79. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 301 (1987) (arguing
that victims should have a limited right to be heard). See also Van den Haag, Limiting Plea
Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1984).
80. A.B.A., Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution
Function and the Defense Function, Standard 2.5 (Tentative Draft 1970). These guidelines
should be flexible enough to permit individual exercise of discretion, but specific enough
to make general policies known to the bar, the bench, and the public; policies that will
contribute to the fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of criminal law. The Boulder
County District Attorney's office has had written plea bargaining policies since 1982.
Eleven of the twelve lawyers interviewed said that they were aware of existing, unwritten
policies "published" by their local district attorney's offices. See also Bond, Plea Bargaining
in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REV. 823, 834-36 (1976).
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acceptance of guilty pleas from defendants and to regulate requests
from prosecutors to dismiss pending cases, 8 1 the terms used in these
rules are inherently ambiguous
8 2 and incomplete.83
These rules suffer from other infirmities as well. They do not make
it possible to consider court determinations of guilt based on plea bar-
gains as reliable as determinations of guilt that follow trial. This is true
because the rules do not require that a judge determine that there is
sufficient evidence for a conviction based on a plea bargaining. Further-
more, a trial judge's ability to protect the public interest is limited be-
cause these rules do not describe when the reasons given for a proposed
plea bargain are to be deemed adequate or inadequate.
84
Although it may be difficult to develop and enforce standards spe-
cifically applicable to plea bargaining, such standards are necessary if
the system is to maintain its moral force.8 5 Fortunately, much of the
legal groundwork for the development of such standards already exists.
When the United States Supreme Court endorsed plea bargaining in
Santobello v. New York, 8 6 it declared that there was no absolute right to
plead guilty, and that a plea of guilty could be rejected in the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.8 7 A respected observer commented that:
"[A] judge is expected to check the plea bargaining practices of prosecu-
tors and reject plea bargains that are not appropriate to the total circum-
stance ... ."88
A current member of the Colorado Supreme Court, formally its
chiefjustice, has suggested that while the trial judge must be sensitive to
the accused's rights, the trial judge must also avoid endorsing any effort
to secure leniency for its own sake, leniency that is not, for example,
requested in the presence of contrition, repentance or remorse. 89
Other respected observers, commenting on the importance of judicial
supervision, have noted that:
If. . . exchange or bargaining interactions dominate criminal
court operations, then the fears of those who cherish the ideals
of due process would be realized. The indiscriminate manipu-
lation of the powers entrusted to public officials to coerce de-
fendants into yielding important constitutional rights . . .
81. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
82. Pursuant to Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 1I, the court may not accept a
plea of guilty unless it is "voluntary." However, voluntary is not easy to define.
83. Pursuant to Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 48(a), a prosecutor cannot dis-
miss a pending case without court approval. While this rule requires that requests to dis-
miss be supported in writing by concisely stated reasons, the rule does not describe when
the reasons given are to be deemed adequate or inadequate, and neither does Colorado
case law.
84. See supra note 81.
85. See supra notes 5 & 75 (both expressing a concern that law maintain its moral
force).
86. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Colorado Supreme Court has also endorsed plea bar-
gaining. See People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 514 P.2d 69 (1973); People v. Dobbs, 175
Colo. 273, 486 P.2d 1053 (1971).
87. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257, 262.
88. R. McDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING 109 (1978).
89. Erickson, Finality of Pleas of Guilty, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 835, 841 (1973).
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breed(s) contempt and resentment instead of remorse and re-
solve . . . and undermines the justice system's credibility and
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.90
In Colorado, plea bargaining is an established institution expressly
permitted by statute, court rule, and case law. 9 ' However, specific stan-
dards for its regulation have not been adopted by the supreme court or
the General Assembly. Pursuant to the applicable American Bar Associ-
ation standard, a plea bargain should only be approved:
[w]hen consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity
of the offense, and the needs of the defendant, and when there
is substantial evidence to establish that: (i) the defendant is
genuinely contrite and has shown a willingness to assume re-
sponsibility for his or her conduct; (ii) the concessions will
make possible (more appropriate) correctional measures ... or
will prevent undue harm to the defendant from the conviction,
or (iii) the defendant ... has demonstrated genuine considera-
tion for the victim(s) . . . by desiring either to make restitution
or to prevent unseemingly public scrutiny or embarrassment to
them; or (iv) the defendant has (or will) cooperate . . . in the
successful prosecution of other(s) .... 92
In short, before accepting a negotiated plea, a trial judge should be able
to find from the record that the plea serves the public interest.
Colorado's trial judges are required to subject proposed plea bar-
gains to their independent judgment.9 3 To what extent they may, or
should, interpose themselves into the plea bargaining process, however,
is unclear.
In most states,94 the prosecution may not dismiss charges without
judicial approval, 9 5 and, in most states, trial judges may, and often do,
participate in plea discussions. 9 6 By contrast, at the federal level, trial
judges are not expected to participate in plea discussions despite the
fact that they do possess some limited power to regulate the process.
9 7
The Colorado Supreme Court, while ostensibly following the restrictive
federal rule, has consistently backed trial judges who rejected proposed
plea bargains. In so doing, however, it has offered little direction for
90. See supra note 25.
91. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301 (1986); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(f(5); People v. Mac-
rander, 756 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1988); People v. Lucero, 714 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1985); People v.
McGhee, 667 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1983); People v. Wright, 38 Colo. 271, 559 P.2d 249 (1976),
aff'd, 194 Colo. 448, 573 P.2d 551 (1978).
92. A.B.A. Standards, Plea of Guilty, § 1.8 (1968).
93. COLO. R. CRIM. P. II(f(5).
94. Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 186, 207 n.73 (1976).
95. Note,Judicial Discretion to Reject Negotiated Pleas, 63 GEO. L.J. 241, 255 n.93 (1974).
96. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(1); U.S. v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. U.S. v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Com-
binatie Voor Chemische Indus., 75 F.R.D. 473 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); U.S. v. Cowan, 524 F.2d
504 (5th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It should be noted
though that federal authority is shaky because in Cowan and Ammidown, denial of the prose-
cution's request to dismiss was deemed an abuse of discretion. In Perate, denial was af-
firmed on procedural grounds peculiar to that case, and in N. V Nederlandsche Combinatie
Voor Chemische Industries, denial was accepted and not appealed.
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future conduct.9 8
VIII. ANALYSIS
In general, the criminal justice system is becoming more adminis-
trative and less adversary.9 9 Consequently, judges and other court offi-
cials are in danger of becoming mere figureheads. 0 0 Most cases today
are resolved through the process of plea bargaining, a process that many
observers believe is premised not on strict adherence to any consistent
constitutional ideology, but on strict adherence to a bureaucratic rou-
tine grounded on pragmatic concerns.101
This process has its own unwritten rules embedded in the social and
cultural experience of the courtroom.' 0 2 Over a period of time, the law-
yers and judges involved in this process have developed shared notions
of what is fair, both generally and specifically.
10 3
While we may have, as citizens, chosen to place considerable faith in
the criminal justice system's ability to produce just results through such
a cultural system, 10 4 the system's players, its lawyers and judges, have
never had unfettered discretion to arrive at whatever results they think
are fair, free from public accountability. Lawyers and judges have al-
ways been expected to be accountable to the law and to society's needs.
However, in the context of plea bargaining, lawyers and judges do not
appear to be involved in a publicly accountable process because plea
bargaining has low visibility with little public ceremony.' 0 5 It is a rela-
tively private activity, subject only in reality to a local legal culture. If
acceptable standards governing the process can be developed, however,
the criminal justice system will be better equipped to deliver statewide,
uniform, equal justice without having to depend on a local legal culture.
Such standards might also help to facilitate the emergence of profes-
sional and public scrutiny of the process which is essential to a properly
functioning criminal justice system.1
0 6
Our criminal justice system is adversarial in nature 107 and produces
98. People v. Lucero, 714 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1985); People v. McGhee, 667 P.2d 419
(Colo. 1983); People v. 10th Dist. Court, 586 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1978).
99. J. Bond, Plea Bargaining in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REv. 823, 836 (1976).
100. Alschuler, Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 931, 933 (1983). About
half the judges interviewed agreed; the remainder said that judges were not figureheads if
they properly exercised the independent judgment required by Colorado Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 11(f)(5). See infra Appendix A.
101. See supra note 25, at 1129-31.
102. See L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAIN OR TRIAL, 2 (1979); see also Dear, Adversary Review, 57
DEN. U.L. REV. 401, 403 (1980).
103. R. RosETr, JUSTICE BY CONSENT 90 (1976).
104. See supra note 14, at 104 (faith in our criminal justice system is questioned).
105. It has been previously recognized that because of plea bargaining's closed nature,
Colorado courts are only superficially able to observe counsel's performance and deter-
mine whether it meets constitutional standards. See Dear, supra note 99, at 403.
106. See McDonald,Judicial Supervision of the Guilty Plea Process: A Study of SixJurisdictions,
70 JUDICATURE 203 (1987) (noting that the trial judge is the key actor in efforts to "tame
the dragon").
107. See Colquitt,Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 52, 69
n.174 (1988) (whether it can remain so continues to concern thoughtful judges).
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legal principles and articulates legal rights in contested cases only. The
plea bargaining process, however, is designed to produce consensus or
concession. 10 8 This emphasis on settlement materially inhibits the oc-
currence of appellate review, the process through which legal principles
and rights are routinely developed. Appellate review minimizes the bal-
kanization of the legal system into separate fiefdoms by developing uni-
form policies to be evenly applied regardless of locale or local legal
culture. Furthermore, it has promoted respect for the rule of law.
These benefits, traditionally derived from the adversarial system, ought
to be preserved and can be maintained through properly articulated and
enforced plea bargaining standards. Therefore, without such standards
the public may continue to perceive the administration of justice as a
backroom process which is significantly affected by such factors as the
locale in which the case is heard and how much influence the parties
involved have. 10 9
X. CONCLUSION
This hands-on study of approximately one thousand recently closed
felony cases has established that felony cases are customarily resolved
through plea bargaining, a process that produces a negotiated admis-
sion of guilt or responsibility for a crime which may be less serious than
the crime actually committed, or for a crime that did not occur. Further-
more, plea bargaining is pervasive. Accused felons rarely exercise their
constitutional right to have unanimous juries of twelve determine that
guilt has been established beyond any reasonable doubt.
Plea bargaining is currently subject to a local legal culture, there-
108. A respected commentator has argued that our criminal justice system has been
altered from one that was adjudicatory to one that is now concessionary because proce-
dural safeguards have rendered regular trials unworkable. As a consequence, he argues,
the system now "condemns without adjudication." He says that our system is now similar
to the medieval european system which, also due to procedural safeguards, came to use
torture to insure that confessions were reliable. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1978). Others argue that an adjudicatory system is still possible if more
expeditious procedures are used, such as smaller juries non-unanimous verdicts, or trials
without juries in some felony cases. See, e.g., Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984); Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to Plea Bargaining, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 931 (1983). While the Supreme Court has
sanctioned state use of six person juries and state use of non-unanimous verdicts, see
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), present social science studies have questioned the
reliability of decisions by six as compared to twelve persons, and of decisions by non-
unanimous juries. HANS & VIDMER,JUDGING THEJURIES (1986). Many of thejudges inter-
viewed said they could accept changes in trial procedures if it would reduce plea bargain-
ing. Former University of Colorado law professor Albert Alschuler, a proponent of less
plea bargaining, was quoted as having said: "Trials could be simpler. We created this
elaborate trial mechanism, and then we decided we cannot afford to give it to the over-
whelming majority of the people accused of crimes, so we snooker most of them into fore-
going any kind of trial at all." Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 20, 1987 at 24, col. 3. See supra
note 25.
109. The Colorado Bar and Denver Bar Association commissioned a survey of six hun-
dred Colorado residents in which it was reported that 63 percent of those surveyed
thought that plea bargaining was wrong. 16 CoLo. LAw. 3 Bar Notes (Sept. 1987). See also
Bailey & Gerhardt, The Law Machine, The Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 13, 1987, at 32.
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fore, any result obtainable through the process depends upon the geo-
graphic locale and the participants involved. While most judges do
exercise some degree of control over the process, many judges are un-
clear as to how much control they are required or entitled to exercise.
While the public may conceptually believe in the presumption of
innocence, the public may not understand that the presumption is effec-
tively lost in the current criminal justice ,system once formal felony
charges are filed because the system places considerable pressure on
most felony defendants to admit they are guilty of something."10 The
existing system is in need of more meaningful regulation to insure that
equality of treatment, due process of law, and adherence to the rule of
law is afforded to individual defendants and to society."' Therefore,
because the process, as it now exists, is not truly accountable to the pub-
lic, I propose the commission of a detailed empirical study of the plea
bargaining process with an eye towards enacting a comprehensive state-
wide plea bargaining guideline system.
110. More than one of the author's colleagues has vigorously questioned whether this
study supports this conclusion. These judges believe that defendants who bargain would
not give up their right to be presumed innocent if they did not believe they were guilty.
Varying inferences may be drawn from the data produced in this study. The substan-
tial number of accused felons who engaged in plea bargaining and then admitted they
were guilty of something suggests that plea bargaining had influenced them to give up the
presumption of innocence. Whether the presumption has indeed been effectively lost in
the present Colorado system must await further empirical research on questions such as:
would accused felons in Colorado give up the presumption as often as they do now if they
weren't offered the incentives they are now offered? How often would defendants admit
their guilt if prosecutors were perceived as having filed the correct charges and not
overcharged, and plea bargaining were not allowed?
111. Other questions appropriate for a study include: What effect does conflicting Col-
orado legislative policy have on plea bargaining? How is pervasive plea bargaining likely
to affect the continued viability of constitutional rights in Colorado? Will trial-related
rights wither away? How does plea bargaining affect the public's perception of the Rule of





The twenty-seven judges whose cases were studied were inter-
viewed by the author. Seventeen were district and ten were county
judges. Two of the county judges could not answer some of the ques-
tions because felony plea bargaining did not occur in their courts in con-
formance with local practice. Interviews were conducted by telephone
and each interview took about forty-five minutes. The questions set out
below were asked of each judge but not necessarily in the order
presented here.
B. Questions of Judges and Their Responses
QUESTION 1. Which of the following three statements
about plea bargaining appeals most to you?
a. That it is an economic necessity.
b. That it is not economically necessary
and should be sharply curtailed.







What do you think drives plea bargaining?
What is its engine?
Only six of the twenty-seven judges said that
plea bargaining should be sharply curtailed.
Twenty-one felt that it was economically and
psychologically necessary. Thirteen of the
twenty-one said that human nature was its
primary engine, citing most often a desire for
justice and certainty of result. A few felt it
was due to lazy prosecution. Seven of the
twenty-one felt that economics was its prima-
ry engine.
Could prosecutors bargain less if they wanted
to?
Every judge said that less plea bargaining was
possible.
By what standards do you measure proposed
plea bargains? How do you exercise your in-
dependent judgment?
1989]




QUESTIONS 6 & 7.
ANSWER:
QUESTION 8.
Most said that they did not get in the way of
proposed bargains unless the deal seemed
unconscionable. Words and phrases often
used included: Is it fair? equitable? shock-
ing? reasonable? Does it make sense? All
conveyed the message that they examined the
facts and engaged in a personal, subjective
assessment of the proposed bargain. A few
said they looked for real agreement, for ex-
ample: does the agreement resolve the case
to everyone's satisfaction?
How much do you, by your involvement,
maintain and thereby support plea bargain-
ing?
Twenty-two of the twenty-seven judges said
that they, by their behavior, supported plea
bargaining; three said some; and two said that
they only supported it a little.
Do you agree that the public believes that
plea bargains allow defendants to "get away
with something," even if that is a mistaken
belief?
How does that perception affect the public's
overall perception of the administration of
justice?
Most said that the public does believe that
plea bargaining allows defendants to get away
with something, and that this perception dis-
serves the courts. Some felt that the public
does not understand what plea bargaining is
all about and that there is a need for public
education.
Should the criminal justice system reinforce
moral notions of guilt and responsibility?
Does plea bargaining undermine that by in-










Although they varied as to its importance,
twenty-four judges said that the system
should reinforce notions of guilt and six of
those twenty-four said that plea bargaining
undermines it. Seventeen answered the ques-
tion about whether plea bargaining under-
mines notions of guilt with a "no" giving a
variety of reasons including that defendants
who plea bargain do admit that they are guilty
of something. A few thought that plea bar-
gaining served other important purposes
such as not putting victims through trial.
Some felt that plea bargains often produce
the same results that trials produce. Others
felt that trials do not produce the moral re-
sults desired anyway. Three judges felt that
most cases do not require that findings of
guilt be filled with moral content.
Do you agree that some rights are sufficiently
important to warrant restriction of plea bar-
gaining, such as the right to an official deter-
mination that the evidence could support a
finding of guilt beyond any reasonable doubt
and the right to have punishment fit the
crime?
More than two-thirds of the judges believe
that important rights do not require reduc-
tion of plea bargaining, probably because
most believe in it. "Plea bargaining protects
rights by getting at the truth." Severaljudges
said that, "plea bargaining works if the judge
does his/her job."
Could trials be made available to everyone if
existing resources were used more efficiently?
More than half the judges felt that trials could
be made available under the existing system:
fourteen said that the system would not be-
come clogged and eleven said that it would.
Would you object to changing trial proce-
dures if it reduced the need for plea bargain-
ing? Changes such as: limiting the size ofju-
ries and their availability; eliminating the
need for unanimous verdicts in all cases; and
further limiting the scope of the jury selection
process?
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Most of the judges would be willing to con-
sider changing current procedures to reduce
the economic need for plea bargaining:
twelve said that the proposed changes did not
bother them; eight said they might endorse
changes depending on what they were, and
five said they did not like the proposed
changes.
Do defendants have a right to know what
their sentences will be before they plead
guilty?
Only four judges said that defendants have a
right to know what their sentences will be
before they should be expected to plead
guilty. The rest do not feel that defendants
have such a right.
Does plea bargaining promote laziness, self-
interest, and incompetence among lawyers?
Most of the judges said that plea bargaining
can promote incompetence, etc., among law-
yers: Seventeen said yes it does; five said no;
and three said sometimes.
Does plea bargaining increase the risk that
cases will be resolved through favoritism and
personal influence?
Most said that plea bargaining can promote
favoritism and personal influence: Ten said
yes it does; seven said maybe; and eight said
no.
Does plea bargaining allow court personnel
to avoid legislative policy, for example, by
bargaining away sentencing enhancement
charges?
Most said that plea bargaining permits avoid-
ance of legislative policy: sixteen said that it
did; three said no; and six said not really be-
cause, "it's a rational disregard," or "the
General Assembly has given prosecutors dis-
cretion to amend conflicting legislative poli-
cies," or "what is the central legislative pur-
pose"?
Can plea bargaining promote:
a. inequality in the treatment of individu-
al defendants?











c. conviction of the innocent?
d. confusion of the functions of adjudica-
tion and sentencing?
More than half of the judges felt that plea
bargaining does not promote conviction of
the innocent. A little less than two-thirds felt
that it could promote inequality; over two-
thirds felt that it could promote leniency; and
more than half felt that it confused the func-
tions of adjudication and sentencing. In the
latter instance, several judges felt that these
functions could be confused only if the judge
allows sentencing concessions to be a part of
plea bargaining. Many judges stressed that
all of the above could happen but would not
if the judge does his/her job properly.
Do you have a personal investment in plea
bargaining? Do you obtain any benefit from
plea bargaining?
About half of the judges said they had a per-
sonal investment in plea bargaining, most be-
cause of the time it frees up to meet other re-
sponsibilities. A few indicated that they
would continue to support it until something
better comes along.
Do you impose harsher sentences on defend-
ants who go to trial?
Over two-thirds of the judges said that they
did not punish defendants for going to trial.
However, several judges said that stiffer
sentences do sometimes occur because more
information is often learned about the de-
fendant and the crime at the trial than at a
bargained plea.
Has plea bargaining taken judges out of the
game because they no longer have much to
say about the resolution of criminal cases?
More than half felt that judges were not "out
of the game." Eleven felt that judges were
out of it and fourteen said that judges could
still be players if they did their jobs properly.
But they were unclear as to how far they
could go in light of"prosecutorial discretion"
(which has something unclear to do with the
constitutional separation of powers).
1989]
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If plea bargaining were eliminated or sharply
curtailed would there really be a substantial
need for more trials?
Nine of the twelve said yes; three said no.
Could plea bargaining be substantially
phased out without disabling the administra-
tion of justice?
Two said that it could be phased out; but ten
said no, usually giving one of the following
reasons: a) Plea bargaining works; it produc-
es justice by, for example, providing a means
to dampen legislative harshness; b) The sys-
tem would grind to a halt without it.
Is plea bargaining inevitable? Would it occur
through subtrafuge if it were eliminated or
sharply curtailed?
Ten said it was inevitable; two said it was not.
Does plea bargaining give defense attorneys
too much power to influence clients and
thereby distort the traditional attorney-client
relationship?
Nine said it did; two said that it did not; and
one said sometimes.
How willing are prosecutors to bargain away
sentencing enhancement charges, forego ag-
gravated sentencing, or to avoid other legisla-
tive policy?
Ten said, "quite willing." Most of the de-
fenders said that while prosecutors are willing
to bargain away enhancement charges, judges
usually are not willing to let them ignore ag-
gravated sentencing statutes. All the defend-
ers said that more habitual traffic offender
charges could be filed. Three defenders said
that prosecutors often appropriately avoid fil-
ing charges that would require aggravated
sentencing. One defender complained that
prosecutors do not treat similarly situated de-
fendants equally.
Does plea bargaining occur because it gives
defendants the impression that something is













Five of the six district attorneys and four of
the six defenders said yes. "We actually pro-
duce useful results through our plea bargain-
ing."
Do you agree that plea bargaining promotes
incompetence, laziness, favoritism and per-
sonal influence? Do some prosecutors plea
bargain because they are afraid to go to trial
or because they want to be liked or because
they are not philosophically committed to the
prosecutor's traditional role?
Most said no, a few answered yes, and one
prosecutor thought it did and three defend-
ers thought it did, sometimes.
Is plea bargaining a positive factor in the effi-
cient and just resolution of cases?
All answered yes saying that it individualizes
justice, avoids uncertainty, saves money,
speeds justice and promotes uniformity.
Does plea bargaining pressure clients into
giving up valuable rights in return for certain-
ty of result? Such as the right to vigorous and
zealous counsel, and the right to an official
determination that there is evidence that
could support a finding of guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt? Does it produce too much
leniency and thereby sacrifice some of socie-
ty's rights such as having the punishment fit
the crime?
Although six thought that rights could be lost
in the process, most of those six did not think
that it happened very often. One district at-
torney said that it was a defendant's free
choice to give up rights, and two defenders
said the rights were abstract and not that val-
uable in practice.
Does plea bargaining coerce the innocent or
possibly innocent to plead guilty because the
prosecution's offer may be too good to re-
fuse?
One defender thought it did; one thought it
did not; and the remaining four defenders
thought it sometimes did.
Do district attorneys get enough money to try
many of cases?
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Five district attorneys and four defenders
thought they did not get enough money; but
two thought they did.
Are you aware of existing plea bargaining
policies in your local district attorney's of-
fices? Policies that inhibit, constrain or pro-
hibit plea bargaining in certain situations.
Everyone except one defender said they were
aware of "published" policies.
How much of a role does politics play in the
continued maintenance of plea bargaining?
Could prosecutors move away from it if they
wanted to or does local politics maintain it?
Everyone except one district attorney
thought that local politics played a substantial






The table below presents a 6 X 6 array (six districts; six techniques)
that looks at the difference between expected and observed frequency of
use for each of the six plea bargaining techniques observed. If there
were random use of the techniques then X2= o. If there were cohesive
statewide policy in the use of techniques then X2 = 0. The table, how-
ever, displays that use of techniques was dependent on individual pref-
erence. LEGEND: "Expected" frequencies were derived by dividing the



























































































































VALUE OF THE CALCULATED CHI-SQUARE EQUALS 75.232
WITH 25 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. P = .001
